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This paper investigates when patent races will be characterized by vigorous competition and 
when they will degenerate into a monopoly. Under some conditions, a firm with an arbitrarily 
small headstart can preempt its rivals. Such ‘s-preemption’ is shown to depend on whether a 
lirm that is behind in the patent race, as measured by the expected time remaining until 
discovery, can ‘leapfrog’ the competition and become the new leader. An example of an R&D 
game with random discovery illustrates how s-preemption can occur when leapfrogging is 
impossible. A multi-stage R&D process allows leapfrogging and thus permits competition. A 
similar conclusion emerges in a model of a deterministic patent race with imperfect monitoring 
of rival firms’ R&D investment activities. 
1. Introduction 
In markets where the first entrant or first inventor earns a substantial 
premium, competition takes on the characteristics of a race. Patents offer a 
stylized example: the first to make a patentable discovery ‘wins’. While the 
patent does not generally preclude imitation, typically the payoffs to the 
competitors will be discontinuous in the times of discovery. 
This paper analyzes patent races as dynamic games. We focus on 
determining when such races will be characterized by vigorous competition 
and when they will degenerate into a monopoly with ‘blockaded entry’. In 
particular, we examine the conditions that allow a firm with an arbitrarily 
small headstart in the race to preempt its rivals, which we call ‘s-preemption’. 
The key to these questions turns out to be the possibility that a firm which is 
‘behind’ in the race, as measured by the expected time remaining until 
discovery if both firms incur the same costs, can ‘leapfrog’ the competitor 
and jump ahead. When a firm has a chance of pulling ahead it competes 
vigorously, but a follower should drop out of the patent race if the leader 
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can ensure that it will retain the lead until the race is over. This is not to say 
that the followers compete whenever they have some chance of winning the 
patent. Rather, they must have some hope of becoming the favorite to remain 
active. Even if the follower’s chance of winning is almost as good as the 
leader’s, the follower will not compete unless it can jump ahead. We stress 
the importance of the role of the information structure of the game and the 
specification of the technology of R&D for determining whether 
‘leapfrogging’ is possible and whether competition or monopoly will prevail. 
Most previous studies of patent races have predicted that there will be 
vigorous competition until the patent is obtained. Loury (1979), Dasgupta- 
Stiglitz (1980), Lee-Wilde (1980), and Reinganum (1981,1982a, b) restrict 
attention to R&D technologies in which a firm’s past R&D has no effect on 
its current likelihood of discovery. With such technologies the patent game is 
not a ‘race’ because no firm can ever pull ahead. Thus, preemption is 
impossible and firms compete vigorously until a discovery is made. 
Dasgupta-Stiglitz (1980) and Gilbert-Newbery (1982), on the other hand, 
consider deterministic models of a patent race in which an arbitrarily small 
advantage allows the lead firm to act as a monopolist and still preempt its 
rivals. We call such striking absence of competition ‘e-preemption’. Clearly, 
both s-preemption and continuous competition until discovery are extreme 
cases. 
We have two goals in this paper. First, we show that s-preemption does 
not depend on a deterministic technology for R&D. Rather, as claimed 
above, it suffices that the lead firm can ensure that it remains the favorite at 
every stage of the race. Second, and more importantly, we present patent 
races whose equilibria lie ‘between’ competition and c-preemption. In these 
equilibria, firms compete vigorously if they are nearly even, while if one firm 
pulls far enough ahead the others drop out. Thus there is preemption, but 
not c-preemption. 
We consider two quite different sources of the ‘leapfrogging’ which 
generate such ‘intermediate’ equilibria. The first is a model in which the 
R&D process must pass through a number of discrete steps, so that even 
though one firm may be favored in the current stage a follower may still 
jump ahead. The second reason for leapfrogging is that each firm may be 
unable to monitor the current R&D efforts of its rivals, observing their 
progress only with a lag. The information lag allows a follower to catch up 
before the leader can respond. 
Throughout the paper we restrict attention to those Nash equilibria which 
are subgame-perfect. This requirement, due to Selten (1965), prevents firms 
from being fooled by empty threats. The perfectness constraint allows us to 
study the circumstances in which preemption is credible; without perfectness, 
preemption can be obtained so easily that followers can preempt leaders. 
Most previous work on patent races has studied ‘open-loop’ equilibria in 
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which firms pre-commit to time paths of R&D expenditures. An exception is 
Reinganum (1981,1982a). However, past expenditures do not influence the 
current success probability in Reinganum’s models. Hence, pre-commitment 
is irrelevant and, as she has shown, the open-loop and perfect equilibria 
coincide. 
The structure of the paper is a series of three examples which illustrate 
how s-preemption can blockade entry into a patent race and how the 
possibility of leapfrogging can give rise to vigorous competition. Section 2 
uses a continuous-time model in which the intensity of R&D is not variable 
to demonstrate that s-preemption can occur even when the follower has a 
chance of winning the patent race. Section 3 extends the fixed-intensity 
model to patent races with a number of stages to show that once 
leapfrogging is possible s-preemption need not occur. Section 4 presents a 
discrete-time model inspired by earlier work in Gilbert-Stiglitz (1979) in 
which the intensity of R&D is variable, but firms cannot instantaneously 
monitor the R&D activities of their rivals. We show that while information 
lags allow leapfrogging and thus competition, as the information lags shrink 
to zero, the equilibrium converges to s-preemption. 
2. Why compete if you can’t catch up: s-preemption in. the absence of 
leapfrogging 
This section considers an extreme example of preemptive competition in a 
patent race, in which the timing of entry into the race takes on particular 
importance. To emphasize the investment-like qualities of expenditures on 
R&D, we assume that a firm’s current chances of making the discovery 
depend only on its stock of ‘experience’. ‘Current expenditures are of value 
solely as an increase in that stock. We further assume that the intensity of 
R&D is not variable, so that a firm’s experience is just the total time that it 
has engaged in R&D. We then show that if both tirrns would make losses if 
they engaged in R&D until a discovery, then an arbitrarily small headstart 
preempts followers. 
Let wi(t) be firm i’s total experience at date t. Then 
oi(t) = i ei(z) dr, 
‘i 
(1) 
where ti is the date at which firm i entered the patent race, and 
q(t) = 1 if the firm is engaged in R&D at date t, 
= 0 otherwise. 
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Let p(wi(t)) be firm i’s hazard rate at time t; that is, the probability that 
firm i discovers between t and t + dt, conditional or not having discovered by 
t, is ~(wi(t)) dt. We assume that ,u(*) is continuous and monotonically 
increasing, and use the convention 
Pi(t) =Cch(O)- 
Thus firm i’s discovery probability is an exponential waiting time process 
with the time-varying parameter pi. 
Note that the fixed intensity of R&D effort implies that if 
and if i engages in R&D from to on, then 
pt(t)>pj(t) for all tzt,. 
In particular, if firm i enters the patent race before j and if both do 
research, then 
cli(t)>clj(t) for all t, 
beginning with the entry date of firm i. 
These assumptions mean that a late entrant cannot undertake an 
accelerated R&D program and leapfrog an early entrant (as measured by the 
success probability, p), provided that the early entrant continues to do 
research. However, the late entrant may still win the patent race because 
discovery is stochastic. The model in this section distinguishes between 
leapfrogging in the accumulation of research knowledge (a higher w) and 
getting lucky by making the patent discovery. We apply the term 
leapfrogging to the accumulation of knowledge - the research input that 
determines the probability of success. 
A main objective of this section is to demonstrate the importance of the 
timing of entry into a market when there is no leapfrogging. The term E- 
preemption refers to the ability of a firm to prevent the entry of competitors 
by virtue of being a marginally early entrant into the patent race. The 
example shows that s-preemption can occur, despite the stochastic nature of 
research. The key to this observation is the inability of rivals to leapfrog 
their competitors in the accumulation of research knowledge. 
Consider two firms i= 1,2 in a patent race. If I/ is the value of the patent, 
c is the cost of R&D per unit time, and both firms are expected profit- 
maximizers, the expected instantaneous profit for firm i at date t conditional 
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on no firm having yet made the discovery is 
The probability that neither firm makes the discovery before t is 
If r is the (common) discount rate and ti is the entry date of firm i, the 
expected value of the patent race to firm i is 
ni=~exp - rt+i(pl($+pz(r))ds 
‘I I[ 11 {pi(t)C}dt. (4 0 
Firm one enters the race at time tl=O, and firm two enters at an 
exogenously given time t, >O. Both firms begin with no experience [o,(O) 
= w,(O) = 01. 
Note that ,b the profit eq. (2), firm i’s experience affects the firm’s profits 
directly in the instantaneous profit term, as well as in the probability of 
previous discovery. This is the key difference of this model from those of 
Reinganum (1981,1982a), in which past expenditures do not influence that 
current hazard rate. 
Assume that R&D is a viable activity for a monopolist, meaning 
$exp~-[rr+bp(r)dr]}{dl)Vc}df>O, (3) 
but it is not profitable for both firms always to engage in R&D (otherwise 
R&D is a dominant strategy and preemption is impossible). A sufficient 
condition for the latter assumption is 
$exp{-[rr+2ip(r)drlj(p(t)V-c}dl<O. 
The assumption that R&D is profitable for a monopolist requires 
p(o)V--c>O for o>fi, for some 620, 
(4) 
while the assumption that it is not profitable for both firms to always do 
R&D implies 
p(O)V-c<o. 
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The R&D process is an investment in that the expected instantaneous payoff 
is negative at the start but positive for sufficiently large levels. 
We assume that once a firm stops doing R&D it must drop out of the 
race. This might seem an unnecessary assumption, because if a firm stops for 
a while its competitive position can only deteriorate. In fact the assumption 
is not required in a discrete-time tinite-horizon model; its role here is to rule 
out ‘supergame’ phenomena. 
The state of the competition for the discovery is summarized by the 
experience levels c3=(01,02). The strategy of firm i specifies whether firm i 
drops out or not at state c3. Each firm’s decision at a given state must be 
part of an optimal sequential decision beginning with that state. In particular 
firms will not be able to precommit themselves to doing R&D ‘no matter 
what’. Were such commitments possible, it would be an (open-loop) 
equilibrium for firm one to drop out of the patent race and for firm two to 
stay in even if firm two has less experience, because profits would be negative 
with two fnms and any one firm could commit itself to a research program. 
More interesting is the case where firms cannot make arbitrary 
commitments, but are restricted to actions that are equilibria of the patent 
game as it evolves over time [specifically, subgame-perfect equilibria, as 
defined by Selten (1965)]. The following proposition demonstrates that in the 
absence of commitments, a marginal lead in the patent race example of this 
section is sufficient toguarantee a monopoly position in R&D. 
Proposition 1 (e-preemption). Assume: 
(i) R&D is a viable activityfor a monopolist [inequality (3)]; 
(ii) it is not profitable for both firms always to engage in R&D [inequality 
(41; 
(iii) firm one enters the patent race before$rm two [tz > t, =O]. 
With these assumptions, a unique perfect equilibrium exists and has the 
property that whatever cl, firm one engages in R&D and firm two drops out of 
the patent race. 
The proof of the proposition is given in the appendix, but the intuition 
behind the result can be explained with the help of fig. 1. This diagram 
shows the critical level of experience that yields firm j a zero expected payoff 
from the patent race if firm i has experience Oi and both engage in R&D 
until the discovery is made. This critical level of experience is labelled a(oi); 
the function is symmetric and continuous for both firms. For states Us above 
the curve a(~,), firm two makes prolits if both do R&D, and for states to 
the right of a(o,), firm one makes profits if both do R&D. 
If both firms stay in from the start, both make losses by assumption. Thus, 
if firm two does not drop out at the beginning with certainty, there must be 
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Fig. 1. Breakeven experience levels for the two litms. The dotted line is the path of R&D 
experience when both lirn~s do R&D. 
some probability that firm one drops out. But note that if both firms engage 
in R&D, the time path of their experience levels is a ray with slope 1 that 
cuts the wr axis reflecting the headstart of firm one. Such a ray is shown in 
the figure. The crucial point is that firm one will reach the level of experience 
that guarantees a zero profit when both compete until the discovery is made, 
before firm two does. That is the ray in fig. 1 cuts Syw,) before it cuts a(@,). 
Thus, if that point is reached, firm one stays in, and since firm two would 
incur a loss if it continued, it must drop out. Then backwards induction 
precludes firm two from chasing firm one out, because both firms realize that 
later on firm two will have to drop out. The key to the result is that firm one 
can guarantee that it stays ahead, and thus that whenever firm one would 
make zero profits if both firms stayed in, firm two would have a loss. This is 
the same reasoning as in Dasgupta-Stiglitz (1980) and Gilbert-Newbery 
(1982), extended to a stochastic technology for R&D. As we shall see once 
firm two can ‘leapfrog’ firm one the above reasoning fails. 
The key aspect of the s-preemption argument is the impossibility of 
leapfrogging. While we presented the above model with a fixed intensity of 
R&D, this is not central to the. s-preemption result. In section 3, we show 
that in a discrete-time framework with variable intensity of research, the 
equilibrium converges to the s-preemption equilibrium as the time periods 
shrink because the leader is able to perfectly monitor the activity of its rivals 
and hence avoid the possibility of leapfrogging. 
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3. Multi-stage patent races 
In the fixed-intensity model of the preceding section, discovery is 
stochastic, but the probability of discovery is always greater for the firm with 
more experience. This section alters the fixed-intensity model by adding 
randomness in the link between R&D and the accumulation of pay-off 
relevant experience. This allows a firm to leapfrog another firm in terms of 
expected progress toward innovation. Specifically, we follow Roberts- 
Weitzman (1981) and assume that R&D takes place in a number of stages. 
To keep matters simple, assume there are only two. In the first stage a 
preliminary invention must be made, corresponding, as an example, to the 
conceptual definition of a research program. We will sometimes refer to 
completion of the first stage as the ‘preliminary invention’. The second stage 
entails the progress toward a patentable design, with the rewards going to 
the winner of the patent race. Alternatively, the model in this section also 
would apply to a more realistic competition where the first stage is research 
and demonstration and the second is development, provided that the payoff 
disproportionately favors the first firm to complete the research, 
demonstration, and development cycle. 
As in section 2, there are two firms (i= 1,2) with the same research 
technology. Firm one begins the race an exogenously specified time t2 ahead 
of firm two, and firm two makes an (expected) loss if both do (the two stages 
of) R&D until one of them obtains the patent. However, the tirm that is 
behind in the first stage has a chance of being the first to make the 
preliminary invention and thus to induce the other firm to drop out. 
The first phase of R&D costs c1 per unit of time, and firm i’s probability 
of making the preliminary discovery if it has not made it earlier is p(o!(t)) 
per unit of time, where w,!(t) is its first-stage experience at t. Similarly, the 
second phase costs c2 and the probability of winning the patent is 0(of(t)), 
where w;(t) is firm i’s experience in the second phase. Both p and 9 are non- 
decreasing functions. Firms cannot accumulate second-stage experience 
without having made the preliminary discovery. We assume the fact that a 
firm has made the preliminary discovery becomes public knowledge at the 
date of discovery. 
Leapfrogging can occur in the following way. Suppose both firms are in 
stage 1 and o:(t)>w:(t), so that firm two lags firm one in expected value 
terms. With probability pZ(t), firm two will make the preliminary discovery 
and its probability of success discontinuously jumps to 0(O). This will exceed 
firm one’s success probability if firm one is still in the first stage, and the 
difference can be large enough to force firm one to drop out of the patent 
race. It is in this sense that one firm can leapfrog another. 
Leapfrogging can be illustrated in a simple example where the discovery 
probabilities are constant in each stage. Both firms may compete in the first 
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stage, and when one makes the preliminary discovery, the other will drop out 
if the race is a natural monopoly when both firms do R&D. Preemption 
occurs at the date of the preliminary discovery, but it is not s-preemption in 
the sense that one lit-m drops out of the race if the other firm has greater 
experience, as occurred in the model of section 2. An example that illustrates 
both leapfrogging and s-preemption is one where the probability of discovery 
is constant in the second stage (and equal for both firms), while in the first 
stage the probability of making the preliminary discovery increases with’ 
experience. This yields the following result: 
Proposition 2. When the conditional probability of discovery increases in the 
first stage and is constant in the second, there exists a unique perfect 
equilibrium. The leading firm always does R&D unless the other firm does R&D 
and completes the first stage before a specified (possibly injnite) time til. 
Depending on the values of the parameters, the follower either (i) drops out at 
the start, (ii) does R&D until c5’, or (iii) always does R&D, unless the leader 
passes the first stage before (6’ + t2). 
Thus, depending on the parameter values, the outcome is either E- 
preemption as in (i), or the two firms will compete despite the fact that both 
firms cannot earn positive profits if they continue R&D indefinitely. The firm 
that is behind in the first-stage race may continue R&D because it could 
make the preliminary discovery first and leapfrog its rival. Just how long the 
follower can stay in the race will of course depend on the progress of the 
other firm. 
Proof The structure of the proof of Proposition 2 is similar to that for the 
first proposition, although complicated by the two-stage nature of the patent 




which is positive by assumption. If both firms pass the first stage, they both 
compete in the second stage and earn identical, positive expected profits, 
Expected profits in the second stage are the same for both firms because the 
success probability, 0, does not depend on experience. 
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The expected profits are positive if both firms are in the second stage, but 
the decision points in the patent race occur when only one firm has made the 
preliminary discovery, or when both firms remain in the first stage. Let ~3,’ 
denote the (possibly infinite) level of first-stage experience such that a firm 
with experience less than (3’ (exceeding 6’) drops out (stays in) when the 
other firm has completed the first stage. First note that ti’ cannot be zero; 
otherwise a perpetual duopoly would be viable.’ It is easy to show that if p1 
is unbounded, 0’ is finite and is defined by 01 s I exp -(r+@s-ip(ti’+r)dr {p(G’+s)W’-c,}ds=O. I (5) 0 
If p is bounded, say, by p, thkn 6 l is given by (5) if p W2 > cl, and is infinite 
if fiW’5c,. 
Assume that 8’ is finite and consider the game when only one firm has 
completed the first stage. Firm one stays in if and only if t 2 (I, ‘, when firm 
two has made the preliminary invention. In the reverse situation, firm two 
stays in if and only if t-r2 Iti’. Suppose that neither lirm made the 
preliminary discovery at time (I, ‘. Two cases are possible. Either firm two 
makes an expected profit when both firms stay in ‘forever’ or it does not. In 
the lirst case, firm one, which has more experience, also has ‘stay in’ as a 
dominant strategy. Then both firms stay in. In the second case, the race from 
t=G1 on is a natural monopoly. It is straightforward to extend the proof of 
Proposition 1 to show that there is s-preemption: Firm two drops out at 
cZ~.~ Thus if both firms are still in the first-stage R&D race at time G,‘, 
either fir; one becomes a monopolist [case (ii) in Proposition 21 or both 
firms always do research, unless firm one passes the first stage before 
(d.9 + t2) [case (iii)]. 
Now consider the race before time 3’. The value for either firm of making 
the preliminary discovery is M2. Note also that the value at cij’ - i.e., the 
value when both firms have done R&D until ti’, but none has discovered - 
is higher for firm one than for firm two, whether firm two drops at W’ or 
not. Again a straight-forward extension of the argument in section 2 shows 
that either firm two drops at time 0 [case (i) in Proposition 21 or both firms 
do R&D until 6’. 
Let us now assume that 6’ is infinite. Let p be the upper bound on the 
first-stage discovery probability. Note that a necessary condition for a 
monopoly to be viable is that pM2>cl. But this condition does not imply 
‘Firm two loses money if both firms start with no lirst-stage experience and always do R&D. 
A/orb-i it loses money if it starts with no experience and the other has already passed the first 
stage. 
‘In this race firm one indeed has a new advantage relative to section 2: Firm two will drop 
out il’ firm one makes the preliminary invention before (61’ + t2). 
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that pW2 >c,, and thus the case of an infinite 13’ is possible. When 6’ is 
infinite, the firm that is preempted at the preliminary discovery drops out 
immediately. The payoff for the firm that wins the first-stage race is M2. This 
situation is equivalent to a simple competition for a patent of value M2. 
There can be two cases: If this simple race is a natural monopoly, firm two 
drops out at time zero. If duopoly is viable,3 then both firms do R&D until 
one passes the first stage and becomes a monopolist. Q.E.D. 
A curious feature of the two-stage patent race is that the payoff to the 
winner of the first-stage competition may decrease with time. Suppose firm 
two begins the first-stage race with less experience, and consider its return 
from making the preliminary discovery before firm one. From Proposition 2, 
we know that firm one will drop out of the patent race if and only if firm 
two makes the preliminary discovery first at some time before ~3,‘. Thus firm 
two has an expected value from the preliminary discovery of M2 if it makes 
the discovery before 0’. After til, firm one will continue R&D until one of 
the firms wins the patent race in the second stage. Since the probability that 
firm one will complete the first stage increases with time, the payoff to firm 
two decreases with time, provided that firm one remains in the first stage. 
The behavior of the return to firm two from the first-stage discovery is 
summarized in fig. 2. 




Fig. 2. Firm two’s value of making the preliminary invention first. 
‘Again duopoly may be viable in the lirst stage even if it is not globally, i.e., when both firms 
never drop out before one of them obtains the patent. 
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The case in which the probability of discovery is constant in the first stage 
and increasing in the second is equally simple. In this case again firms 
compete even if the whole race has the natural monopoly property. The 
reader can check that both firms do R&D in the first stage, and that when 
one firm makes the preliminary invention, the other firm drops out either 
instantaneously or after some specified time if it has not succeeded in passing 
the first stage by that date. 
The model in this section has the characteristic of a race for a patent 
whose value decreases over time. Imagine, for example, that in the one-stage 
model of section 2, a substitute for the good that can be produced under 
patent protection will be introduced T periods from the start of the patent 
race. Then the value of discovery decreases and potentially is nil at time 7: 
The equilibrium for such a patent race very much resembles that of case (ii) 
in Proposition 2. The follower, if it does R&D at all, drops out after some 
given time. Of course an important difference in the multi-stage patent race is 
that the follower may make the discovery before UT,’ and leapfrog the leader, 
which may cause the leader to drop out of the patent race. 
4. A patent race with information lags 
Leapfrogging could occur in the preceding model because the probability 
of success was a stochastic function of R&D effort. Completion of the first 
stage was a random event, and by being lucky in the first stage, a firm with 
less experience could leapfrog a more experienced rival. Leapfrogging also 
may occur if firms have only imperfect information about the activities 
of their competitors. In this case a firm may leapfrog not because the success 
probability is stochastic, but because it can make progress toward invention 
without revealing its progress to a more experienced competitor. The 
impossibility of up-to-the-minute monitoring of a rival’s R&D program 
allows firms that are only slightly behind to catch up before the leader can 
react. In this way information lags allow leapfrogging, and an arbitrarily 
small lead need not preempt rivals. 
Information lags can be represented in a discrete-time formulation of the 
patent race. Each firm has a choice of R&D levels within a time period. At 
period t, firms are completely informed about the R&D activities of 
competitors up to period t- 1. To keep the model simple, suppose invention 
occurs when the first firm accumulates a specified level of knowledge, as 
measured by total R&D (the extension to discovery as a stochastic function 
of R&D is straightforward). Firms may ‘learn’ at the rate of one or two units 
(steps) per period, with learning at the slower rate being more efficient. 
Information lags occur because within the current time period, each firm 
must choose its R&D effort without knowing what rival firms are doing. 
Thus, if a firm is one unit ahead of a rival, and it elects to proceed at the 
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more economical learning speed, the follower may catch up with an effort 
level of two, and in the next period it may move ahead. 
We show that the firms will proceed at the high effort level only if they are 
separated by no more than one unit of experience. If either firm lags by two 
or more units, it drops out of the race. The leader then proceeds at the more 
economical lower effort level. Allowing for random discovery where the 
probability of discovery depends on experience would not alter this basic 
result. In the limit of shorter information lags, the follower always drops out, 
so that both firms compete only if they are tied. This limit result shows that 
s-preemption, while special, is not an artifact of the fixed-intensity 
specification of section 2. We also show that the equilibrium is unique if the 
race is not too long. An interesting feature of (every) equilibrium path when 
firms begin with equal experience is that there is a burst of R&D followed by 
the eventual emergence of a monopolist. The initial competition for the 
patent on average dissipates the monopoly profits. 
There are two firms i = 1,2. R&D competition takes place in discrete time, 
t=O, l,..., and oi(t) denotes firm i’s experience at time t. Discovery occurs 
with certainty when a firm’s experience is equal to or exceeds a given number 
of ‘units of experience’ N. If both firms reach the critical level N in the same 
period, a firm receives the patent if its total experience exceeds that of its 
rival. If they tie, each firm wins with probability 0.5. The value of the patent 
for any firm is I! 
Let ei(t) denote the effort level of firm i in period t, and define the 
cumulative effort as 
1-1 
oi(c) CT?0 ei(4. 
Each firm can choose from the alternatives shown in table 1 in any period, 
with associated costs. 
Table 1 









Despite the temporal nature of the competition, explicitly introducing a 
positive rate of time preference would serve no purpose. We will assume that 
firms prefer to obtain a given reward sooner rather than later, which would 
follow from an arbitrarily small rate of time preference or a lexicographic 
ordering on money and time. 
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Let I; be the largest even integer such that firms with an experience level 
N-E could both compete at the high-effort level and earn non-negative 
profits. That is, playing the high-effort level E/2 times to get V/2 is 
worthwhile:4 
V/2-(IE/2)c,>O> V/2-(E/2$l)Cp 
We make the following assumptions: 
(A.l) c2>2c1, 
(A.2) &‘2-c,>O, 
(A.3) N s2k. 
(A.l) implies that a monopolist would always choose the low-effort level. 
(A.2) says that maintaining the high-effort level for one period in order to tie 
for the patent is worthwhile. (A.3) bounds the amount of effort required to 
discover in terms of c2. Its only purpose is to shorten the analysis. 
Let ki = N -CJJ~ be the amount of effort remaining for firm i. A strategy for 
each firm i, s;, is a mapping from experience levels of both firms to the 
choice of effort, 
We allow mixed strategies. Define V’(ki, kj) as the expected return to firm i 
when it has ki steps to go, firm j has k, steps, and firms follow their optimal 
strategies. we will show that for min(ki, kj) <II the equilibrium is symmetric 
so that I/(ki, k,) depends only on the state and not on the name of the firm.] 
The main results are summarized in the following proposition: 
Proposition 3. In any perfect equilibrium, if the follower is two or more steps 
behind, it drops out. If it is one step behind, and if the number of steps left is 
not too large, it randomizes between dropping out and incurring the high cost; 
the leader randomizes between the high- and the low-effort levels. If both firms 
are tied, they compete vigorously (i.e., incur the high cost) tf the number of steps 
is less than k+ 1, and otherwise they randomize. The equilibrium is unique if 
the number of steps remaining for the leader is less than E+ 1. 
Proof: Let k be the number of steps left for the leader. We treat only k < II in 
the text; the proof for krE is in the appendix. For k<k we show that the 
‘For simplicity we shall not consider the case in which there exists a E such that V/2=(/7/2/c,. 
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V(k+j,k)=O for jzl, 
if j> 1 the follower drops out, 
V(k, k) = V72 - n(k)c,, n(k) = k/2 for k even, 
=(k+1)/2 for k odd. 
(i) says a firm which is tied in the patent race would like to have incurred the 
extra cost V///2 [and a fortiori (c2 -ci) from assumption (A.2)] in order to be 
leading by one step. (ii) says that the valuation of the follower is always zero, 
and that he drops out when behind by two or more. (iii) gives the valuation 
‘on the diagonal’, i.e., when firms are tied, where n(k) is the number of 
periods until discovery when both firms compete vigorously. Note that ks’E 
implies V/2>n(k)c,, and firms earn positive profits if they have equal initial 
experience. For k > I;, the appendix shows that firms will choose mixed R&D 
strategies and earn zero expected profits. 
Assume that firm one is the leader (k= k,). Using (i), (ii) and (iii), we will 
show that the optimal actions for each firm are as given in table 2, where 




1 ;1,23 or 1 [0,2] or 2 
0 2 2 
Consider the optimal strategies for firms one and two when k, = 1, so that 
firm one has only one step remaining in the patent race. If the two firms are 
tied with k, = 1, the unique equilibrium is e, =et =2. Although there is only 
one step to go, both firms compete at the high-effort level because the patent 
is awarded to the firm with the most experience when both reach the critical 
experience level, N, in the same period. Note that the resulting state 
valuation for (k,, k2) = (1,l) is 
V(l,l)= v/2-c,, 
and this is consistent with postulate (iii) above. 
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Next consider k2 =2 and kl = 1, so that firm two is behind by one step. 
Would firm two drop out of the patent race with probability l? If so, the 
optimal strategy for firm one would be to proceed at the monopoly pace 
(e, = 1). But then the follower could catch up and earn V/2 by incurring cost 
c2 with a positive net return. Hence, playing e,=O with probability 1 could 
not be an equilibrium strategy for (k,, k,)=(1,2). It should be clear that the 
leader would never play e, =O. The leader can guarantee itself V-c, by 
choosing the high-effort level, and this strictly exceeds the return from e, =0 
given any. R&D choice by the follower (if the follower plays e, =0, firm one 
gets the same payoff, but later). Thus, the leader can play only e, = 1 and/or 
e,=2 when (k,,k,)=(1,2). 
Note that the leader must randomize between effort levels of 1 and 2, since 
the follower would drop out if e,=2 (and the leader would then choose e, 
= l), and the follower would choose e,=2 if e, = 1 (in which case the leader 
would be better off with e, =2). With the leader randomizing between 1 and 
2, it is never optimal for the follower to choose eZ= 1, because the follower 
cannot even tie for the patent. Also, the follower cannot choose the high- 
effort level with probability 1, because the leader then would do the same, 
and the follower would always lose. We conclude that firm two randomizes 
between 0 and 2, while firm one randomizes between 1 and 2. 
Since the follower plays e,=O with some probability and this gives a zero 
return, the return from e, =2 also must be zero, otherwise the firm would 
either drop out or proceed at the high level with probability 1. The follower 
must be indifferent between dropping out and trying to catch up. Thus, for 
the follower, 
V(2,l) =o, 
which is consistent with postulate (ii.a). The leader plays e, =2 with some 
probability and this gives a guaranteed return of V-c2, which must equal 
firm one’s valuation. Thus, 
V(1,2)= V-c,. 
Note that V(2,2) = V( 1,l) = V/2 - c2, so that 
V( 1,2) - V(2,2) = v/2, 
and thus, postulate (i) is satisfied for k= 1. 
Proceeding by induction, assume that (i) and (iii) are satisfied when the 
leader has at most k steps to go, and consider the case where k, = k + 1. 
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Case 1: k, = k,. The jirms are tied. 
We will show that both firms playing 2 is the unique equilibrium. First 
note that it is an equilibrium: each firm receives V/2-n(k+ l)cz, compared to 
(-cl) from playing 1, or zero from playing 0. Next note that it is not 
optimal for either firm to do no R&D in any period. If firm i chose ei =0, its 
valuation would be 
V(k+l,k+l)=tOV(k+l,k+l)+t,xO+t,xO, 
(where t,, cl, t2 denote the other firm’s probabilities of playing 0,1,2). If 
to < 1, this implies V(k+ l,‘k+ 1) =O. Yet playing ei = 2 ensures a positive 
payoff. If to = 1, then playing 1 dominates playing 0. 
If the other firm never plays 0, it is not difficult to see that playing 2 
dominates playing 1. If firm i plays 1, the return is 
tlV(k,k)+t,xO-c,, (6) 
while the return from playing 2 is 
t,V(k-l,k)+t,V(k-l,k-1)-c,. (7) 
Subtracting (6) from (7), noting that t, + t2 = 1, gives 
tIIV(k-l,k)-V(k,k)-c,]+t,[V(k-l,k-l)-c,]+c,. (8) 
Since the postulates (i)-(iii) are assumed to hold for k, Sk, it follows that 
both terms in brackets in (8) are positive, and ei =2 is the unique equilibrium 
strategy. Thus, 
V(k+ l,k+ l)= V/2-n(k+ l)c,, 
and this confirms (iii) by induction. Finally, V(k, k+ 1) is greater than or 
equal to I/-n(k)c,, so that V(k, k+ 1) - V(k+ 1, k+ 1) 2 V/2, which confirms 
(9. 
Case 2: k, -k, = 1. Firm one leads by one step. 
Let ti be the probability that the follower plays e, = i for i=O, 1,2. If the 
leader plays e, =0 with positive probability, the return must be 
V(k+1,k+2)=t,V(k+1,k+2)+t,V(k+1,k+1)+t2x0, 
and, since to = 1 -(cl + t2), this is equivalent to 
V(k+ l,k+2)=(r,/(r, +t,))V(k+ l,k+ 1). (9) 
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Now from postulate (iii), 
V(k + 1, k + 1) = V/2 - n(k + l)c,, (10) 
and clearly if the leader plays zero, making use of (10) and (9) shows that 
But note that, if the leader plays e, =2 each period until discovery, he earns 
v-n(k+ l)c,. 
This strictly exceeds the return from e, =O, so the leader does not play 0. 
Could firm one proceed at the monopoly pace with certainty? In this case, 
the follower’s payoff to catching up is 
V(k, k) - c2 = V/2 - [n(k) -t I]$, 
which is positive because, by assumption, k+ 1 <E. Thus the follower would 
want to play 2 with probability 1; but then the leader would prefer playing 2 
by induction hypothesis (i). The follower cannot play 0 with certainty either. 
In this case the leader would proceed at the monopoly pace. Lastly the 
leader cannot play 2 with certainty: the follower could not catch up and 
would drop out of the race, inducing the leader to proceed at the monopoly 
pace. 
We thus conclude that the leader randomizes between 1 and 2, and the 
follower between 0 and 2. Let p be the probability that the leader plays 1 
and q the probability that the follower plays 0. Since the follower must be 
indifferent between dropping out with a value of zero and trying to catch up, 
the return from the high-effort level must be zero; that is, 
or 
pV(k,k)-c,=O, 
P = cd V/‘/2 - +W- 
(lb 
(14 
Since k+ 1 <E, the denominator is at least as large as c2 and O<p < 1. Also, 
q must be such that the leader is indifferent between R&D at the high- and 
low-cost levels, so that 
q[V-cz-(k-l)c,]+[l-q][V(k-l,k)-c,] 
=q[V-(k+l)c,]+[l-q][V(k,k)-c,], (13) 
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or 
q=[V(k-l,k)-V(k,k)-(c,-c,)]/[l/(k-l,k)-I/(k,k)-c,]. (14) 
From (i) and assumption (A.2), O<q< 1. 
Lastly note that dropping out is an optimal strategy for the follower. Thus, 
his valuation is zero and (ii) is satisfied: 
V(k+2,k+ l)=O. 
Case 3: k2-k, 22. Firm 1 has a lead of two steps or more. 
Let us first show that playing zero is dominated by playing 1 for firm one. 
If firm two plays 0, playing 1 is optimal since it is the monopoly pace. If the 
follower plays 1, or if the lag is at least 3, playing 1 ensures, from induction 
hypothesis (ii), that the follower will drop out next period. If the follower 
lags by 2 and plays 2, playing 0 gives V(k + 1, k + 1) to the leader and playing 
1 yields V(k,k+l)-c,. But from(i), V(k,k+l)-c,>V(k+l,k+l). 
Suppose the follower does R&D and incurs cr or cl. In the next period the 
follower will continue to lag the leader by at least one step. Thus the 
follower’s valuation will be zero, and he is better off not doing any R&D. We 
thus conclude that the follower drops out and the leader proceeds at the 
monopoly pace. This proves that (ii) holds when the leader has (k+ 1) steps 
to go and the lead is at least two. Q.E.D. 
We have thus shown that for k<E there exists a unique perfect 
equilibrium, and that this equilibrium has the properties given in Proposition 
3. The case where kzl; is treated in the appendix. Summarizing the results 
shown in the appendix, if V/2-(Ii/2)c, -cr CO, the equilibrium is unique and 
the induction postulates (i) and (ii) hold; (iii) is replaced by V(E+j,E+j)=O. 
In the complementary case V/2-(Ii/2)c,-cc, >O, condition (ii) is still 
satisfied, but there may exist asymmetric equilibria in which V(li+j,E+j) is 
positive for one firm. 
Comparative statics of the patent race 
The simple model of the patent race contains only a few parameters and it 
is straightforward to examine the competitive consequences of alternative 
assumptions. 
(a) Suppose that the value of the patent is increased, for example by means 
of a longer patent life or a liberalization of antitrust laws against the 
exploitation of a patent monopoly. This will have no impact when the gap 
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between firms is two or more effort units. If they are tied, it will increase the 
amount of competition, in the sense that firms can sustain a high level of 
R&D effort over a longer time interval. 
Note that the smallest experience level, (N-Q, for which firms compete 
with pure strategies is defined by the largest even number I; that satisfies 
1//2>(E/2)c,. Thus increasing V clearly increases E For k <E, the firms will 
invest in R&D at the rapid pace and their activities will be redundant. 
Unless the gains from accelerated discovery are sufficient to compensate for 
the extra costs, the welfare consequences of increased competition resulting 
from the larger patent reward are unambiguously negative in this simple 
model. 
A larger patent reward also increases the range of experience levels over 
which a firm will continue to compete if it is one period behind the leader. 
The follower with (N-k) units of experience will compete provided the value 
of catching up exceeds the cost, 
Iqk-2,k-2)>c,. 
Since V(k-2, k-2) increases with the size of the reward, for k 5 IE, a larger 
reward increases the range of experience levels over which firms compete. 
Consider the consequence of an increased reward on the leader’s strategy. 
Let p be the probability that the leader chooses e= 1. The condition for a 
mixed strategy by the follower requires [see eq. (12)] 
p=c,/V(k-2,k-2) for V(k-2,k-2)>c,. 
A higher reward lowers p and therefore increases the expected effort by the 
leader. It can also be shown that a larger reward increases the expected effort 
by the follower. Thus, a larger reward increases the likelihood of leapfrogging 
as well as the range of experience levels where the follower continues to 
compete. 
(b) A crucial parameter in the patent race model is the length of the period 
over which firms cannot observe the actions of their rivals. This is the source 
of imperfect information in the model. Let T be the period length (or lag in 
information). Assume that this length is cut by half: T/2. To keep things 
comparable, we leave the (physical) number of units of experience N 
constant, but we assume that firms can in period t acquire 4 unit of 
experience at cost cJ2 or 1 unit of experience at cost c,/2. From the 
definition of E, we see that the number of periods over which there may be 
competition between a leader and a follower doubles, so the real length of 
time stays constant. But notice that now the follower competes only if the lag 
D. Fudenberg et al., Compefition in patent races 23 
does not exceed i. More generally, we see that when the length of the period 
decreases, the lag in experience for which the follower competes gets smaller. 
Thus the imperfect-information variable-intensity equilibrium converges to the 
e-preemption equilibrium when the lag in information tends to zero. 
A striking feature of this model is that the follower always has valuation 
zero in equilibrium regardless of the length of the lead. While we think that 
there is an important point here, we do not want to insist that arbitrarily 
small disadvantages cause a zero valuation in the presence of information 
lags. The zero-valuation result will not hold if there is sufficient uncertainty 
about discovery (there was none in this section) and a large enough 
information lag. To see this consider the open-loop equilibrium described in 
Lee-Wilde (1980). Open-loop strategies are perfect when the information lag 
is infinite. Although there is no experience and no initial asymmetry between 
the firms in LeeWilde, it is easy to introduce these two features and still get 
the outcome that more than one firm can make positive profit in the patent 
race. Whether the follower has a positive valuation or not should depend on 
the degree of uncertainty, the length of the information lags and the 
specification of the hazard function. 
5. Concluding remarks 
The central issue addressed in this paper has been a characterization of 
the conditions that facilitate competition in patent races. Although we have 
not attempted a general analysis, the three examples illustrate the importance 
of leapfrogging in the accumulation of experience relevant to the probability 
of discovery. This is evident in a comparison of the first two models. When 
the relative ordering of firms’ cumulative experience is immutable, as in the 
example of section 2, any lead in the patent race is sufficient to preempt a 
rival firm when the market is otherwise too small to accommodate both 
firms always engaged in R&D. This s-preemption occurs even though 
discovery is stochastic, and each firm has a positive probability of winning 
the patent race. Allowing for the possibility of leapfrogging in relevant 
experience levels enables both firms to compete for the patent, at least over 
finite intervals, provided the firms do not begin too far apart. 
The third model differs from the others, among other reasons, because 
success is not a stochastic function of experience: the first firm to reach a 
critical level of experience wins. But here again the main determinant of 
competition is the possibility that a firm which is behind in the patent race 
can change places with the current leader. The mechanism for this 
leapfrogging behavior is information lags, which essentially allow a firm to 
sneak up on and eventually pass the current leader in the patent race. It 
should be clear in the development of the patent race model with 
information lags that introducing uncertainty in the patent discovery would 
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not alter the main results. In particular, e-preemption would occur if the 
leader could perfectly monitor the R&D effort of the follower, and potential 
leapfrogging would remain the key to competition. 
In section 2 we argued that a one-stage game with variable intensity may 
lead to a natural monopoly situation. If this is the case in the second stage of 
the two-stage game described in section 3, the first firm that passes stage one 
(at any time) becomes a monopoly. We can attribute a fictitious patent value 
to passing the first stage equal to the expected present discounted monopoly 
profit in stage two. Thus the game is ‘like a one-stage game’, and if rent can 
be dissipated by high enough intensity, we again obtain e-preemption at the 
beginning of the first stage.5 We thus see that the possibility of leapfrogging 
in the multi-stage (or random experience) game will depend on the degree of 
uncertainty, on the lags in information and on the R&D technology. 
The behavior exhibited in our patent races differs from the implications of 
models studied by Loury (1979), Dasgupta-Stiglitz (1980) Reinganum 
(1981,1982a,b) and others. Experience is not a factor in these models. We 
would expect that introducing experience and dynamic strategies into these 
models would result in market structures that become more concentrated 
over time as firms’ probabilities of success become dispersed. In some 
specifications, a sufficient lead in payoff-relevant experience might cause the 
patent race to degenerate to a monopoly from the start. 
We have assumed in this paper that all firms were equally efficient in the 
performance of R&D. Once firms’ efficiencies may differ, it is no longer 
reasonable to assume that each firm knows the payoff functions of its rivals. 
That is, the information structure will typically be incomplete in Harsanyi’s 
(1967) sense. This leads to an alternative to leapfrogging as an explanation of 
competition with selection (but without s-preemption) in R&D. In a patent 
race time selects the most eflicient or motivated firms, an idea developed in 
Fudenberg-Tirole (1983). 
This paper is an exploration of the middle ground between patent races 
without preemption and those in which preemption is virtually automatic. 
We stressed that the extreme results in previous work were due to very 
special information structures and technologies, and we provided examples of 
patent races whose equilibria were, we argued, more plausible. As our 
purpose was primarily to exhibit such ‘intermediate’ patent races, we relied 
on quite simple models. We did not fully develop the comparative statics of 
the equilibria nor did we pose such questions as the optimal length of a 
patent. These issues are well worth addressing. While this paper endows us 
with a small headstart in understanding patent races, we encourage potential 
leapfroggers. 
‘Roger Guesnerie and Patrick Rey suggested this reasoning to us. 
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Appendix 
A.I. Proof of Proposition I 
Let a(o) be the level of experience such that a firm with initial experience 
Q(W) has a zero expected payoff when the other firm has experience w, and 
both t3-m~ do R&D ‘forever’. That is, Q(o) is defined by 
$elP{-[ a i-s+ [p(Q+z)+p(o+z)] dz 11 {/1(52+s)V-c}ds=O, (A.l) 
where (s1, o) is the initial state and [p(Q+s), p(w+s)] are the conditional 
success probabilities after a time s has elapsed from the initial date. 
Assume that the probability p is a continuous function of experience (this 
assumption can be relaxed with a somewhat more complicated proof). Then 
Q(o) is continuous and it is easy to check that Q(O)>0 (when both firms with 
no experience always do R&D, they both lose money) and that sZ(ti)<< 
(a firm with experience W or more is willing to stay in, whatever the experience 
of its competitor). Note that there exists an experience level w (O<a ~6) 
such that Q(o) = 0; when both firms start with experience w and stay in, they 
just break even. 
The equilibrium strategies on Proposition 1 have the property that a firm 
either does R&D until discovery or drops out; staying in for a while and 
then dropping out before discovery is never optimal. To see this, assume the 
initial state is Cs =(w,, oJ, both firms do R&D until date t, and firm 1 drops 
out of the race at t with zero expected profits. They by definition the state at 
t is 
and 
6(t) =(sa(w, + t), co2 + t), 
n,(8(0, + t), 02 + t) =l7,(cqt)) =o. 





Since firm one’s profits are zero at state w(t), it must be the case that 
p(w,+s)V-cc0 for sst. 
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Therefore n,(G)<0 and firm one would never join the patent race. For 
similar reasons, firm two would never begin an R&D program and then 
stop before discovery. Also, since monopoly profits are positive, if either firm 
drops out, the other should continue R&D. 
Note that this argument proves that the graph of D has the concave 
curvature shown in fig. 1. More precisely, 
B(w+t)--Lko)<(O+t)-fil. 
Now consider the following strategies: 
(a) If wr zo2, firm one stays in (until it discovers). Firm two drops out if 
and only if w2 5 a(~,). 
(b) If w1 <02> firm two stays in (until it discovers). Firm one drops out if 
and only if o1 $ a(~,). 
It is easy to check that these strategies form a perfect equilibrium. For 
example, when firm one is ahead (wi >w,), firm two can never induce firm 
one to stop, so that the latter will stay ahead. Thus, firm two can do no 
better than to stay in if and only if o2 > !2(w,). 
Next we show that in any equilibrium firm two drops out immediately, 
while firm one never drops out. Choose any equilibrium and assume to the 
contrary that there exists a time t such that, conditional on neither firm 
having dropped out at t, firm one drops out with some probability. Let Fi 
denote the supremum of such dates, and define & analogously for firm two 
(we will show below that T2 exists). We know that T1 5 cl, and & 5 0 + t,. 
First we show that if F1 exists, then F1 ~7~. Imagine that F1 2F2. Then past 
rl, no firm will drop out. But firm one’s probability of discovery at each 
instant strictly exceeds that of firm two. Thus, if firm one is willing to drop 
out at Fr, firm two must strictly prefer to drop out, which contradicts & 5 7i. 
Now we show that firm two drops out with probability 1 at ?i. Since firm 
one stays in from F1 on, firm two’s best response is either to drop out or to 
stay forever. If firm two stays in at TX then firm two’s experience at date ?,, 
o,(t,)=7i - t,, is no less than s2(F1). But if 
then & >Sa(Fi - tJ. Thus firm one strictly prefers to stay in at F1, which 
contradicts the definition of &. Thus firm two drops out with certainty at r,. 
Lastly, because firm two is sure to drop out at F1 and a monopoly makes 
strictly positive profit, firm one would not drop out at (Ti -E) for small E, 
again contradicting the existence of ?i. We thus conclude that firm one never 
drops out, which implies that firm two never does R&D. 
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To complete the proof we observe that the above arguments imply that FZ 
does indeed exist: because the race is a natural monopoly at least one of the 
firms must sometimes drop out. Thus if firm two never dropped out firm one 
would have to; and reasoning as above would yield a contradiction in the 
subgame starting at time ?r. Q.E.D. 
A.2. Proof of Proposition 3 when the leader has at least 15 steps remaining 
There are two cases as V/2 -(k/2)c, - cr 20. In each case the follower has 
valuation zero and drops out when two or more stages behind. In the first 
case the follower may play a mixed strategy when one step behind, while in 
the second case the follower always drops out. Only in the second case is the 
equilibrium unique. 
Case I: v/2-(E/2)c,-cl>o 
We will prove the following claims by induction on step E+j from j = 0: 
(i) The leader never plays e, =O. 
(ii) l$(lE+j+ 1, k+j) =0 for all j (this implies that if the follower trails by 2 
or more, it drops out). 
(iii) At (E+j,IE+j), either there exists a j such that K(li+j,l+j)=O or for all 
j, l$(lt+j,E+j)~max[0,c,-jc,]. If l@+j,k+j)>O, firm i plays 2 with 
positive probability. 
To start the induction we consider states (E+ 1,1;+ l), (k,k+ 1) and 
(P+ 1,1;+2) [the treatment of the case (L, E) is as in case 1 in the text]. 
At (E+ l,k+ l), if neither firm has a zero valuation, neither firm plays 0. 
Then both must sometimes play 1; otherwise, if one firm put no weight on 1, 
its rival could not have a positive valuation [as it could at best catch up, 
with a net return 1//2-n@+ l)c, CO]. If both firms sometimes play 1, their 
valuation cannot exceed V(k, L) -cr c c2 -cl. Moreover, if neither firm plays 
0, both must put some weight on 2: if either played 1 with certainty, playing 
2 would yield V(lt- 1, I;)-c, > V(& It) -cl. Finally, if one firm has a zero 
valuation, its opponent must put some weight on 2. Otherwise, the firm 
could obtain V(lE- 1, iF) - c2 > 0 by playing 2. Thus (iii) is satisfied. It is easy 
to show that there exists asymmetric equilibria (for example, one firm 
randomizes between 1 and 2, and the other randomizes between 0 and 1). 
Second, consider (IE,IE+ 1). First note that the leader can guarantee 
Y(E-2, E- 1) -c2 >O by playing 2. If the leader plays 0, he gets at most 
V(S It) s V(l;- 1, It- 1) < V(k- 2, I;- 1) - c3. Thus the leader does not play 0. 
Hence, the follower drops out: if he played 1, he would remain the follower 
and lose c,; if he played 2, he would get at most V(k- 1, IE- 1) -c2 ~0. Thus 
the leader proceeds at the monopoly pace and the follower drops out. 
EER- B 
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Lastly, consider (li+ l,k+2). First note that the leader can guarantee 
V(E- 1, Q-c1 > 0 by playing 2. Now we will confirm that the leader doesn’t 
play 0 and the follower has value zero. There are three cases, corresponding 
to the three possible equilibria at (E+ 1, k+ 1): either (a) the current leader’s 
value, V,(li+ 1, E+ l)=O, or (b) the current follower’s value, V,(E+ l,IE+ 1) 
=0, or(c) max[I/L(E+l,li+ l), V~lt+l,It+l)]cc,-c,. 
In case (a), the leader’s payoff to playing 0 is zero, so doing R&D 
dominates. Thus the follower drops out, as I/(/c, k) -c2 ~0. In case (b), the 
follower will put no weight on 1, which yields only -ci. Then the leadA 
payoff to 0 is again zero, so he will do R&D and the follower will drop out. 
Finally, in case (c), if the leader played 0, an optimal strategy at (k+ 1, Is+ l), 
if his valuation is positive, is ‘play 2’ and yields at best V(k- l,F+ 1)-c, 
[notice that if the follower plays 2 at (I;+ 1, k+2) and the leader plays 0, the 
leader has a zero payoffJ. But the leader could guarantee exacJy this ptiyoff 
one period earlier by playing 2 now, and so would do so from our 
‘impatience’ assumption. Thus again the leader does not play 0, ?nd the 
follower drops out. 
Now we assume the induction hypotheses (i)-(iii) hold when the leader has 
E+j steps to go and extend them to k+j+ 1. 
Consider first (E+j+l,E+j+l). We claim that either one firm has a zero 
valuation or both play 1 and 2. If neither firm has a zero valuation, neither 
plays 0; but then, if one firm never played 1, its rival’s valuation could not be 
positive. If one firm played only 1, its rival could play level 2 until li and 
obtain at least V-((j+ 1)/2)c, -EC, >c2 -jcr -cl, which is the maximum 
return to playing 1. [Remember that at (SE+ 1) and (iF+ l,E+2) the follower 
drops out.] Thus if no firm has a zero value each must have value less than 
c,-(j+ l)c,. Finally, if one firm has a zero valuation its rival must put some 
weight on 2: otherwise the firm could play 2 until E and gain a positive 
reward. 
Next we consider (E+j+ l,E+j+2). The leader can guarantee a positive 
value by playing 2 until I;. Now we confirm that the leader does not play 0 
and that the follower has value 0. There are three cases, corresponding to the 
three possible cases at (E+j+ 1, E+j+ 1): 
(a) V,(l;+j+ l,R+j+ l)=O, 
(b) V#+j+ l,E+j+ l)=O, 
(c) max[V,(E+j+l,k+j+l), Vr(E+j+l,E+j+l)]<c,-(j+l)c,. 
In case (a), the leader will not play 0. Therefore the follower will not play 
1 from induction hypothesis (ii). Next we claim the follower must put some 
weight on 0. This is clear if Vdk+j, IE+j) <c2, otherwise V,(E+j, E+j) =O, 
and if the follower played 2 with certainty the leader would play 2 and the 
follower would drop out. So J$(li+j+ l,E+j+2)=0. 
In case (b), the follower will not play 1. If the follower played only 2, the 
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leader would play 2 and the follower would drop out. So the follower must 
have value 0. Because the follower never plays 1, the leader won’t play 0, 
which would yield 0 unless the follower played 0 with certainty in which case 
the leader would play 1. 
In case (c), if the leader played 0 it would have at most c,(j+ l)c,, which is 
less than what the leader can guarantee by playing 2 until li. But then the 
follower drops out: playing 1 yields (-c,), and playing 2 yields at most 
i$(E+j,E+j)-cz< -jc,. Q.E.D. 
Case II: V/2-(1;/2)c,-c, <O 
In this case there exists a unique perfect equilibrium. It is symmetric and 
satisfies: 
(i) V(li+j,E+j+ l)= V-(E+j)cl, 
(ii) V(E+j+l,iG+j)=O, and the follower drops out with probability 1 
(a fortiori the follower drops out when more than one step behind), 
(iii) V(lr+j,I;+j)=O. 
To start the induction we consider state (li+ 1, It+ 1). At this state we claim 
there is a unique equilibrium. In this (symmetric) equilibrium, both firms put 
positive weight on all three actions (and so in particular have value 0). First, 
at least one firm must play 0. If the other firm never plays 0, playing 1 yields 
at most V/2-(Ii/2)c, -cr CO, yet if both play 2 both receive V/2-(E/2)c, 
-c2 ~0. Let firm i be the firm which plays 0. 
(a) Firm i does not play 0 with probability one, or j would play 1 and i 
would play 2. 
(b) Firm i must put some weight on 2. Otherwise, j can guarantee 
o-n(iF+ l)c, > 0 by playing 2, so j would not play 0, and i would get 
at most V/2-(E/2)c,-c, CO. 
(c) Firm j must play 2. Otherwise, i would prefer 2 to 0. 
(d) Firm i must play 1. Otherwise, j would prefer 1 to 2: both acts yield the 
same contingent payoff if i plays 0, if i plays 2, j’s gain from playing 1 
instead of 2 is -cl-(v/2-(E/2)c,-c,)>c,-v/2+(E/2)c,>o. 
(e) Firm j must play 0, or i would not play 1. 
(f) Firm j must play 1, or i would not play 2 [as in (d) above]. 
We conclude that the equilibrium must be totally mixed. As the payoffs are 
symmetric, the totally mixed strategies are unique. 
Next we assume (i), (ii), and (iii) hold for (j- 1) and extend them to j. 
(i) At (It+j,I;+j) there is again a unique equilibrium which is totally 
mixed. Again, some firm i must play 0 with some probability - if the 
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other lirm never plays 0, playing 1 yields -cl, while if both play 2 they 
receive max ( V/2 - n(k+j - 2)c,, 0) - c1 < 0. 
(a) Firm i cannot play 0 with probability 1, or j plays 1 and i plays 2. 
(b) Firm i must play 2. Otherwise, j guarantees itself V-(k+j-2)c, 
- c1 > 0 by playing 2, and so j would not play 0, and i would not 
play 1. 
(c) Firm j must play 2. Otherwise, i would prefer 2 to 0. 
(d) Firm i must play 1. Otherwise, j does not play 2, which is 
dominated by 1. Playing 1 is preferable if i plays 0, while if i plays 2, 
playing 2 instead of 1 costs c2-cI >O. 
(e) Firm j must play 0. Otherwise, i would not play 1. 
(f) Firm j must play 1. Otherwise, i would not play 2 [as in (d)]. 
Again the equilibrium is totally mixed, and thus unique. 
(ii) At (It+j,k+j+ 1) the follower drops out with certainty. The leader can 
guarantee V-c,-(K+j-2)c, by playing 2, and thus won’t play 0. Then 
the most the follower could hope to obtain by catching up is 
-c2 +max(O, V(& I;)) ~0. Thus the follower drops out and the leader 
plays one. Q.E.D. 
Note that in this case the only 
-c2 >O, so that it pays to proceed 
monopolist. 
bound on N needed is V-(N-2)c, 
at level 2 for 1 period to become a 
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